This work examines the role of penalties as providers of incentives to prevent medical errors and ensure that such incidents, once they occur, become common knowledge. It is shown that a scheme with two penalties (accountability and non-report) induces the first-best solution. However, this scheme does not necessarily imply a punitive environment, but may, under given circumstances, yield insignificant and even negative penalties. Alternative sanction systems, such as voluntary reporting and immunity, are found to have less desirable properties. An exception is confidentiality (anonymity) which turns out to be an optimal scheme. Finally, the examination of various penalty restrictions (scope and scale) shows that such barriers may promote both tougher and softer sanction schemes.
Introduction
In the medical literature, a medical error is defined as an injury or illness caused by medical management, rather than by the underlying disease or condition of the patient (adverse events), or an event that could have resulted in an injury or illness, but did not (near misses), either by chance or through timely intervention (DH, 2000) . Errors are often classified as unpreventable (normal risks), preventable (with the current state of knowledge), and negligent (a subset of preventable errors that satisfy certain legal criteria).
1 Literature on medical errors is mainly concerned with US institutions and data. Brennan et al. (1991) and Leape et al. (1993) reviewed the medical charts of more than 30000 patients admitted to 51 different acute care hospitals, and found that adverse events, preventable adverse events, and negligent adverse events occurred in 3.7%, 2.3% and 1% of the admissions, respectively. An Australian study of 28 hospitals reported that adverse events occurred in 16.6% of admissions, of these 13.7% caused permanent disability, while 4.9% caused death (Wilson et al., 1995) . Observational studies identify even higher error rates (see e.g. Weingart et al., 2000 and the references therein). The health economic literature on errors focuses primarily on malpractice law. Simon (1982) and Danzon (1991 Danzon ( , 1994 Danzon ( , 2000 extend analysis on tort liability (see Posner, 1972; Brown, 1973; Shavell, 1980) and discuss optimal insurance for various liability rules. Other works include the impacts of malpractice litigation on provider pricing and income (Danzon, Paul and Kington, 1990) , insurance premiums as tort signals (Thornton, 1999) , experience rating in insurance (Sloan et al., 1990) , and how litigation in the past affects future malpractice risk (Jensen et al., 1999) . Studies confirm that liability reforms have reduced medical expenses without having important consequences on health outcomes (see e.g. Localio, 1993; Dubay, Kaestner and Waidmann, 1999; McClellan, 1996, 2002) -findings that suggest practice of defensive medicine. 2 Malpractice law has been criticized since the early 1970s on the grounds of inefficiency and poor distribution (see e.g. Danzon, 2000 for more details). Since then, U.S tort reforms have been implemented, e.g. limits on awards and contingent fees. In the course of the last few years, a new perspective on medical errors, -the new "patient-safety movement"-has been introduced. Although no general consensus exists, two basic premises in this literature are (i) the focus on learning and (ii) the need for adequate reporting incentives (see e.g. Sage, 2003; Bovjberg, Miller and Shapiro, 2001 ; Leape and Berwick, 2000; Studdert et al., 2004) . 3 The current underreporting of errors represent costly information losses (Studdert et al., 2004; Gostin, 2000) . 4 Learning effects from near misses may be as important as learning from adverse events, and DH (2000) describes near misses as free lessons. 5 The importance of disclosure, openness, and transparency is emphasised. The literature also deals with the effect informal penalties may have on medical decision-making, e.g. that responsible professionals involved in errors experience feelings of guilt and shame (Leape and Berwick, 2000b) . Effective risk management (patient safety) depends crucially on (i) the establishment of reporting requirements and (ii) the abolishment of current cultures of "blaming, naming, and shaming" (Leape and Berwick, 2000; Wu, 2000) . Suggested policy reforms vary from author to author, and radical advocates perceive malpractice systems as ineffective and counterproductive, both with respect to deterrence (defensive medicine) and reporting. They suggest non-punitive systems (Mello et al., 2003) . 6 Others argue in favour of liability, but call for more system-orientated approaches to improve patient safety, e.g. enterprise or organizational liability (Reason, 2000) . 7 Still others want to retain individual liability, but are in favour of more lenient sanction systems (safer environments). Voluntary reporting, confidentiality, and immunity are believed to make it safer to admit errors (Blendon et al., 2002; Lamb et al., 2003; ISMP, 1999 and a special issue of the British Medical Journal: 320, 2000) .
The intention of this work is to analyse these new perspectives on patient safety. This is done by starting out with a standard economic framework where penalties can be used to provide incentives. Malpractice law concerns adverse events, assigns individual blame on the basis of negligence, and ties penalties to patient damages. The forthcoming model is more general since it includes error-learning effects, informal penalties (moral costs), near miss liability, and non-reporting penalties. Distributive issues are ignored in the sense that penalties are not tied to observed patient injuries (although one can of course redistribute fines to injured patients). The intention is to identify the first best regime, thus evaluating what role liability should have-whether liability is needed, and if so, in what way, and at what level? In this way, the analysis also sheds light on the adequacy of current contracts. The analysis is not concerned with what level to put the blame (liability level).
8,9
The regulator is concerned with short-term error prevention (precautionary care) and learning. The provider faces a two-step decision process. First, she decides on preventive care to reduce the risk of errors. Second, if a medical error occurs, she decides on whether to report the incident to the regulator. The occurrences of errors and their characteristics are (partly) private information for providers and influence their reporting decisions. The model is one with risk-neutral agents and precautionary care and treatment effort are collapsed into one decision variable (effort). Several markets failures, all considered relevant for health care institutions, are taken into account.
10 Effort is unobservable to the regulator-uncontractable ex-ante and imperfectly observable ex-post. Liability is determined by the negligence rule. Negligent errors are imperfectly monitored by the regulator (detected from patients' reports or provider self-reports). The provider faces a probability function of medical errors and a probability of being held liable given the occurrence of an error. These assumptions reflect two types of informational limitations. First, providers cannot fully self-insure against errors due to the possibility of blunders and misunderstandings, meaning they are not perfectly informed about all the effects arising from clinical decisions. Second, they are not perfectly informed (ex-ante) about the due care standard (noisy negligence rules). This assumption is reasonable since a complete specification of such contracts is prohibitively costly (transaction costs). Thus the activities of reviewers and juries, in the case of litigation, can be understood as imperfect ex-post verifications of the level of care and the relevant due care standard. Hence, a provider, after privately observing an error, does not know with certainty whether she will be held liable. The policy instruments considered are fines (material deprivation) not imposing any social costs as they are redistributed to similar individuals in the economy (costless transfers). Other potential, but costly policy instruments, such as liability-and detection probabilities, are treated as exogenous variables.
11 In addition, legal costs and evasion activities are not considered.
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Literature on mechanism design (auditing) and the hidden-action information literature are drawn upon (see Kaplow and Shavell, 1994 for further references). Tax collection and truth-telling incentives are discussed in Border and Sobel (1987) , Mookherjee and Png (1989) and Andreoni et al. (1998) . In works on pollution control and reporting incentives, the object of regulation is an externality (negative), monitoring is probabilistic and costly, and self-reporting is socially desirable because of enforcement costs savings, or because early knowledge may reduce the problem. 13 In the context of errors and patient safety, additional dimensions are introduced, since the object of regulation (medical errors) represents two externalities-patient injuries (negative) and learned lessons (positive). The positive externality applies to all errors (near misses and adverse events), while the negative one applies to adverse events. Monitoring in relation to medical errors is costless (to some extent) because of patient complaints and self-reports.
In Section 2, the general model is presented first, followed by identification of the firstbest sanction regime. In Section 3, the same model is modified to capture alternative and less punitive sanction systems (voluntary reporting, confidentiality and immunity), in order to asses whether such reforms involves obstacles for reaching the first-best. Finally, the model is confronted with several real-life constraints (institutional barriers) to identify the efficiency implications (Section 4).
An Optimal Penalty Scheme
The representative provider, exposed to a risk of committing errors, undertakes a two-step decision process. First, she decides on how much to invest in costly preventive activities to avoid errors. Second, given the occurrence of an error, she decides on whether to report the incident or not. In the following, p(e) denotes the probability of a medical error, where e is effort invested in reducing this probability. p(e) is continuous, twice differentiable, and a strictly decreasing function in effort: p e < 0, p ee > 0.
At the end of the first period, for a given e, physicians observe privately whether an error has occurred or not, and if so, what type. Two error categories exist, defined according to their implications for social costs [(A)dverse events and (N)ear misses]. D is the expected social cost of adverse events while the social cost of near misses is zero.
14 Error costs include patient injury and discomfort, productivity losses, household production costs and treatment costs such as rehabilitation, increased hospital stay, and medical expenses. For each error category two states are possible, each described by a certain liability probability [(H)igh and (L)ow], r i j , where i = A, N and j = H, L.
15 Thus four error types, two for each category (adverse events and near misses), may occur, differing according to their liability probability. The actual occurrence of an error need not imply liability for various reasons, e.g. normal risks, too costly to prevent, inherent scientific and clinical uncertainties, and differences in evidence quality (imperfect ex-post verification).
After experiencing an error providers face two options-whether to report the incident (self-report) or to lie low (non-report). Both choices involve informal penalties. Given the decision to self-report, a cost b is imposed e.g. to reflect patient anger, the feeling of being singled out, exposed, and one's competence questioned (adverse publicity and reputation losses), in the following denoted as the shame-parameter. 16 For physicians who keep silent, a parameter a is introduced (guilt-parameter) to reflect the fear of being discovered as well as the moral costs that accompany violation of ethical responsibility for informing the patients and the regulator. 17 In the case of non-reporting, physicians face a probability of being detected by the patient, the patient family, or by colleagues, q i . 18 A relationship between error category and (exogenous) detection probabilities is assumed: q A > q N > 0, since outcomes that inflict much discomfort on patients will be more difficult to hide. Error type and error category frequencies are common knowledge. Let β and 1 − β be the share of adverse events and near misses, respectively, while V i j is the share of errors of category i with liability probability j, where i, j V i j ≤ 1, and where q i , β, V i j , r i j , a, b and p(e) are known to the regulator. 19, 20 A model with two penalties (fines), uniform in all states, is assumed-one that concerns accountability (ex-ante) and one that concerns reporting incentives (ex-post). A penalty, t, is imposed if the physician is held liable. 21 This penalty is the same regardless of how the incident was revealed to the regulator. The regulator may also impose a penalty, s (non-report penalty), for those who fail to report if detected. Consequently, an individual choosing not to self-report, but is detected, is penalised by t + s, while a self-reporting individual held liable is penalised by t. The above penalty structure assumes that non-reporting behaviour can be penalised, even if not held liable for negligent acts (separate liability). The timing of the game is presented in Figure 1 . In the following, the second stage is described (ex-post) in more detail. Physicians know at this stage whether an error has occurred, and which type they are confronted with, and face a detection risk, if they lie low, as well as a liability risk. The expected costs, given the occurrence of error type i j, are:
where SR i j is expected costs given self-reporting, while NR i j is expected costs if failing to report. It is observed from (1a) that the self-report cost is the sum of the shame parameter and the expected accountability penalty-the product of the liability probability, r i j , and the accountability penalty itself, t. The non-report cost (1b) is the sum of the parameter reflecting guilt, the expected non-report penalty if detected, and the expected accountability penalty if detected and held liable. It is observed that the self-report cost, SR i j , depends on the accountability penalty, t, while the other mode of behaviour, NR i j is a function of both penalties.
The condition that ensures self-reporting, given the occurrence of error type ij, denoted the optimal reporting rule, is:
It follows from (2) that if the "shame" associated with self-reporting is significantly higher than the "guilt" that goes with lying low (a shame dominated culture: m ≡ b − a > 0), a high non-report penalty (s) and a low accountability penalty (t) are needed to induce self-reporting. The conclusion as concerns s is self-evident, while the role of t is explained by considering the following expressions:
It is observed from (3) that the marginal increase in the expected costs from a higher accountability penalty is higher for self-reports than for non-reports, since non-reporters may evade a penalty. Hence, an increasing t weakens the incentives for self-reporting. For a detection probability close to zero, self-reporting can only occur in guilt-dominated cultures (m ≡ b − a < 0). Individuals choose differently depending on error types and the significance of informal penalties (a and b). It also follows that providers, given laissez faire, are not indifferent between reporting and lying low. The expected penalty, given the occurrence of an error, but before knowing what type of error has occurred (penalty function), is:
The first period decision (ex-ante), where physicians are to decide on the level of precautionary care, follows from:
C p is expected provider costs, being the sum of effort costs (e) and the expected penalty-the product of the error probability and the penalty function. The outcome from not experiencing an error, with probability 1 − p(e), is zero.
In order to identify first-best levels of effort and information, a social criteria function must be introduced. Information about errors is valuable as it will help to reduce the future number of errors, a natural approach thus being to let the planner minimise social costs over a planning horizon. However, an ethical dilemma arises if the social problem is presented like this e.g. the planner will trade-off injuries among current and future patient groups (see the appendix for a dynamic formulation and a discussion of this dilemma). Lexicographic social preferences, defined in terms of (current) social costs and information benefits, are now being introduced to restrict the planners' opportunity to include learning effects. First, the planner minimises (current) expected social costs (effort costs and expected injury costs), C r , which yields the following first-best precautionary care level:
where e * (due care) is the level which equates marginal effort costs with the (current) marginal expected patient benefits from error reduction: 1 = −p e (e * )β D. 22 The level e * determines the expected number of patient injuries (errors). Second, for a given e * , the planner decides on how many errors should be self-reported. The social value of information is assumed to increase with information quantity, thus all errors should become common knowledge (complete self-reporting).
23 Note that informal costs (feelings of shame and guilt) are not defined as social costs. It is not obvious whether provider discomfort related to non-compliance with law (non-reporting), patient anger, and the fear of being detected should be considered as social costs. One the other hand, feelings of guilt and remorse and concern for the patient could be (see e.g. Lewin and Trumbull, 1990 ).
The penalty function, for a level of s that ensures complete reporting (s * ), now becomes:
Lexicographic preferences imply an optimal scheme where t is guided by an objective to induce e * . This is achieved for β D = R S R (t * , s * ), by rearranging, the following expression is derived:
where r is a weighted average of liability probabilities. It follows from (8) that t * is positive if error costs exceed the shame parameter. This is because an unregulated provider does not internalise all social costs and a positive fine is needed to get the incentives right.
24 If the opposite is the case, unnecessary treatments occurs, thus t * must be negative. It is also observed that t * decreases with r. The next step for the regulator, given t = t * , is to set s to induce complete self-reporting. To solve this problem, I first define levels of s i j that make the optimal reporting rule binding for all error types. This provides us with the following four critical levels:
s i j is the lowest possible value s can attain, for error type ij, and still induce self-reporting. The first-best non-report penalty becomes; s * ≥ max{S i j }, saying that the optimal nonreport penalty must equal (or be higher than) the highest critical value of s as defined by (9). We know by assumption that s AH > s AL and s NH > s NL . Furthermore, it is assumed that s NH > s AH . 25 Hence, error type NH (near miss with a high liability probability) becomes relevant, and the optimal non-report penalty becomes:
The penalty s * implies by definition that NH errors become self-reported, and the same penalty ensures self-reporting of other error types as well, since for any t and s, the incentives are least significant for NH errors. For a binding (10), s * increases with the shame parameter and the accountability penalty, but decreases with the guilt-parameter and the detection probability. Hence, the optimal sanction regime, described by (8) and (10), induces the first-best in spite of market failures. Table 1 shows signs for the first-best penalties for various rankings of a, b and β D. The sign of t * is determined by comparing error costs to the shame parameter, while the sign of s * depends on t * and whether the medical culture is shame-or guilt dominated. A positive accountability penalty implies a positive non-report penalty. The non-report 
penalty, in shame-dominated cultures (m > 0), is positive (or zero) and independent of the sign of t * . This result follows because self-reporting costs are significant in shamedominated cultures, thus a positive s * is needed to ensure self-reporting. It is also observed that the first-best penalty scheme is most punitive when β D > b > a, while the opposite ranking yields a non-report penalty equal to zero and a negative accountability penalty.
The analysis shows that the availability of two fines (accountability and non-reporting), both being uniform for all states, is sufficient to induce the first-best. Furthermore, the first-best penalties can be low, equal to zero, or even negative, depending on the significance of moral costs, error costs, liability probabilities, and detection probabilities. Thus non-punitive regimes ("safe environments"), as suggested in parts of the error literature, will not generally provide adequate incentives. To get the incentives right a sanction system with sufficient flexibility is needed. As observed from Table 1 , a non-punitive regime (t = s = 0) is optimal only in only two particular environments. The analysis confirms, as often claimed in the error literature, that accountability penalties are reporting disincentives. However, the solution to this problem is not to reduce them but to introduce non-reporting penalties. The introduction of more flexibility into the model, e.g. by having two accountability penalties (separate penalties for adverse event and near miss or by conditioning size on the degree of negligence) can never worsen matters. Abolishing the principle of near miss liability (while keeping adverse event liability) is not a hindrance for reaching the first-best. 27 The analysis suggests that malpractice law, in the absence of liability insurances, is not an efficient institution for two reasons: (i) non-reporting penalties are absent and (ii) penalties are tied to patient injuries and not to social costs.
28 Liability insurances reinforce efficiency problems since weakening the incentives for precautionary behaviour.
The model assumes a regulator able to observe all relevant model parameters. In practice, this is not the case. One example is that informal penalties are likely to vary across providers (local medical cultures). This informational asymmetry combined with heterogeneity introduces second-best solutions. However, the ability to ensure self-reporting need not be severely limited. A sufficiently high non-report penalty still induces self-reporting. 29 The situation is different for precautionary care. A uniform accountability penalty (e.g. set on the basis of average shame) implies that some providers under-invest while others over-invest. Variation in skills and clinical experience suggests further unobservable heterogeneity. In addition, optimal regulation could involve efficient ways of excluding the lowest performing providers (bad apples) from the health care sector.
Voluntary Reporting, Confidentiality, and Immunity
The new "patient safety movement" advocates less punitive measures such as voluntary reporting, immunity and confidentiality. In this Section, these reforms are discussed.
30 A problem with this literature is the lack of precise definitions of alternative sanction systems, consequently own interpretations are presented. 31 It turns out that the efficiency properties of each system are quite easily derived by studying the optimal reporting rule (see 2). The three rules now become 32 :
Voluntary reporting: b + r i j t ≤ a + q i r i j t (11) Immunity:
Confidentiality:
Voluntary reporting, here interpreted as s = 0, implies that the optimal reporting rule only becomes a function of the accountability penalty. It is seen from (11) that t influences both modes of behaviour. We already know that socially correct ex-ante incentives are created by t. However, the absence of a non-report penalty is a hindrance for reaching the first-best. To see this consider the condition that now ensures self-reporting for all errors:
. It follows that this condition cannot be satisfied for t * > 0 and m < 0 (a shame-dominated culture).
Immunity, here defined as, the probability of being held liable, conditional on selfreporting behaviour, is zero. It follows from (12) that the liability risk is relevant only if there is a failure to report. As for voluntary reporting the first-best is unattainable, but now for a different reason. Immunity implies that the regulator is left without instruments to influence effort, while the reporting decision is affected by both penalties (t and s). The first-best solution is only attainable if b = β D.
Confidentiality implies that the identity of self-reporting individuals is not revealed to others apart from the receivers of the actual information (protected from legal discovery).
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This sanction system changes the self-report cost from b + r i j t to q i (b + r i j t) since confidential self-reporting now, in contrast to standard self-reporting, does not trigger a judicial process.
34 However, confidential self-reporting is no guarantee against being detected by others (i.e. patients and patient families). It is observed from (13) that the regulator still possesses two instruments, one for each objective, hence the first-best is attainable. An interesting observation is that a higher accountability penalty does not alter the relative incentives between the two modes of behaviour. This observation, ceteris paribus, has two implications. First, the accountability penalty must be higher, relative to results in Section 2, to induce first-best effort. Second, the non-report penalty can be set lower, since a higher t does not worsen relative reporting incentives and because less shame is associated with confidential reporting.
Confidentiality has optimal properties, while on the other hand, voluntary reporting and immunity, are less desirable. Voluntary reporting is unable to ensure self-reporting while immunity is unable to create adequate ex-ante incentives. 35 In a non-punitive system (t = s = 0) both problems are present, since neither self-reporting behaviour nor preventive effort can be managed. In this case, first-best occurs only if β D = b ≤ a. The proponents of less punitive systems stress the importance of creating safe environments, and refer to liability as a reporting disincentive. This analysis confirms that t has this effect for all cases with the exception of confidentiality. However, t serves a different and important function by providing ex-ante incentives. Reporting incentives, on the other hand, should be accounted for by introducing an additional penalty.
36 Consider now the incentives for self-reporting in (11-13). These incentives are worsened with voluntary reporting, but improved with confidentiality and immunity. With laissez-faire, positive and negative effects are observed. Confidentiality is the only scheme that is able to ensure self-reporting for any parameter values. Non-report penalties share similarities with penalties intended to ensure compliance with law, since a higher value reduces the risk of law violations. The accountability penalty, on the other hand, has a different role in internalising error (patient) costs. Too high levels trigger undesirable social behaviour (over-deterrence).
Institutional Barriers
So far this paper has studied a fully flexible regulator, in the sense that penalties can be set at any desired level. However, such flexibility is not necessarily realistic, since penalties serve purposes beyond efficiency such as legitimacy, notions of fairness, and political and practical purposes. These considerations may well impose restrictions on penalty size and scope. One example has already been presented in Section 2. Here, an optimal sanction regime is identified, suggesting a negative penalty (subsidy). A monetary transfer to individuals held liable for negligence contradicts general notions of fairness. In the following three institutional barriers, all considered relevant for the issue of optimal policy, are discussed in more detail. They all reduce regulator flexibility, relative to the model in Section 1, but in different ways. The purpose is to investigate what implications such barriers have for optimal policy, and whether or not, the first-best still remains attainable.
Negligence as a Condition for Imposing Non-Reporting Penalties
So far, the analysis has studied a sanction regime with "separate liability"-meaning that non-reporting behaviour can be penalised even if the provider is not held liable for clinical negligence. This principle may contradict notions of fairness, since the providers have not been involved in any clinical wrongdoings. A less flexible principle is "conditional liability", meaning that s can only be imposed if the provider is held liable for negligence (t > 0). Such a barrier reduces the expected penalty for lying low, since detection does not impose s with certainty, but is contingent upon a subsequent confirmation of clinical negligence (with probability r i j ). The optimal reporting condition, for this barrier, becomes:
As observed from (14), the right side now changes from a + q i (s + r i j t) to a + q i r i j (s + t), implying a lower non-reporting cost for similar parameter values. The restriction on s does not prevent the regulator from inducing self-reporting, however, the non-report penalty, ceteris paribus, must now be set at higher levels to achieve this.
Near Misses Cannot be Litigated
In Section 2, providers were held liable for adverse events and near misses. This was done since both error types can be the result of negligent acts-the failure to take cost-justified precautions. However, in current malpractice systems, only adverse events can be litigated. This is probably so because the objective of tort law (besides deterrence) is to compensate injured patients. What are the implications if near misses cannot be litigated? To take this barrier into account, the accountability penalty must be restricted to adverse events. Let t A be this penalty. By following the same procedures as in Section 2, the first-best accountability becomes:
This finding confirms that near miss liability is not a precondition for inducing adequate ex-ante incentives. However, first-best deterrence now implies a higher penalty level since r A < r . First-best reporting incentives can still be maintained, since absent near-miss liability does not impair the regulators' ability to hold providers liable for lying low (separate liability).
An Upper Binding Limit on the Non-Reporting Penalty
Finally, the case is considered for which the non-report penalty cannot be set according to the desired level: s * >s wheres is the maximum level. Such upper constraints are likely, since the detection probability for near misses, q N , is relatively low, hence it becomes necessary to set s * at high levels (see 10) to ensure self-reporting. This may be difficult in practice for reasons of legitimacy, and since physicians face finite wealth constraints.
An upper binding limit will evidently make the first-best unattainable. The second-best solution, still assuming lexicographic preferences, becomess =s andt = t * , inducing an equilibrium with effort equal to e * , and some unreported error types. 37 However, the ethical dilemma discussed in Section 2 may now be less of a problem. Recall that learning improves in two ways; (i) by increasing the number of medical errors (injuries) and (ii) by increasing the share of self-reported errors. In Section 2, lexicographic preferences were introduced to prevent the planner from setting the accountability penalty low to increase the number of errors (injuries).
38 Now, however, it could be that a low penalty is desirable as it increases the share of self-reported errors. If so, introducing a more flexible welfare function will be less controversial. First, however, it needs to be established whether a trade-off in t actually exists.
Optimal provider effort, given s =s, is determined by:
Differentiating (16) w.r.t e and t yields:
being strictly increasing in t (see former assumptions). Thus, for a higher t and e < e * , expected social costs, C r , will be lower. From (3) we know that a higher t weakens reporting incentives, thus reducing the quantity of information. This information effect can be studied more carefully by using the binding optimal reporting rule to define the following four critical values of t:
which again can be rewritten as:
where t i j is the highest possible value that ensures self-reporting for error type ij. Suppose the ranking: t AL > t AH > t NH > t NL -saying that the critical value of t, for error type AL (adverse event and a low liability probability) is the highest, while NL errors (near miss and a low liability probability) have the lowest value. 39 This ranking enables us to identify which error types will be self-reported for different values (intervals) of t. Table 2 shows how the share of reported errors declines with the value of t. Hence, a trade-off for higher values of t when e < e * is identified. A more flexible welfare function can therefore be introduced.
This welfare function is as follows: ,s) ) is the expected number of errors, when the number of treatments is normalized to one. I (t,s) is the expected share of errors that becomes common knowledge. For t > t AL no error types will be self-reported, which yields I (t > t AL ,s) = q, while for t ≤ t NL all errors are self-reported and I (t ≤ t NL ,s) = 1 (see Table 2 ).
To derive the second-best we need a benchmark case. Suppose t NH is the value of t that induces e * , implying that C r (t NH ,s) = C r (e * ). Furthermore, for t = t NH , NL errors will be unreported, hence I (t NH ,s) < 1 (see Table 2 ). Consequently, the two candidates that exceed t NH (t AL and t AH ) cannot be second-best candidates as they induce higher social costs and less information relatively to t NH . The only remaining candidate is t NL . This value of t implies higher social costs, C r (e(t NL ,s)) > C r (e(t NH ,s) = C r (e * ), but more information (relative to t NH ) for two reasons. First, because all errors now are self-reported inducing I (t NL ,s) = 1 (see Table 2 ). Second, because less effort implies a higher number of expected errors: p(e NL (t NL ,s)) > p(e NH (t NH ,s)) = p(e * ).
40
The two candidates are compared by using (20) which again yields:
The condition for t NL to be the preferred candidate, W (t NH ,s) < W (t NL ,s), can be rearranged as:
As expected, the probability for choosing t NL decreases with the weight (η) and increases with the marginal valuation of information (k). This confirms how an institutional barrier may force the regulator to go "soft" on accountability in order to encourage self-reporting. The regulator is forced to solve two contradicting goals with one instrument, hence we may end up with a less punitive scheme as the second-best solution. An upper binding limit on the non-reporting penalty can be analysed for the principle of confidentiality. As shown in Section 2, confidentiality disconnects deterrence from information benefits since reporting incentives are unaffected by t, hence, the second-best for confidentiality is to set t so that e = e * ands =s. Three institutional barriers are analysed to evaluate their effects on optimal regulation. First, a constraint on the non-report penalty is considered, then a constraint on the accountability penalty. In both cases the optimal regimes underwent changes; however, without obstructing their ability to attain the first-best. However, the situation changed, when an upper limit on the non-report penalty was introduced. Now, second-best solutions had to be considered.
Conclusion
Recent works on patient safety stress that error underreporting is a hindrance for collecting and analysing data in order to develop systematic safety strategies. These views emphasize that patient safety should go beyond the question of deterrence and distribution, and address reporting incentives. Such issues are especially important given the increased efforts to limit health cost in many countries, the rise of managed care in the US, and the continuing debate on tort reforms. This paper shows that a sanction scheme with two penalties (addressing deterrence and reporting) is sufficient to achieve efficiency (first-best). The optimal scheme may well be a punitive one depending on factors such as the significance of informal penalties, social costs, and the relative importance of adverse events and near misses. This finding shows that the implementation of non-or less punitive sanction systems (safe environments) is not necessarily a good idea. The application of principles such as voluntary reporting and immunity does not seem to give promising results, while confidentiality is found to have desirable properties.
It is not obvious that adverse event liability in malpractice law is to be blamed for the current underreporting of medical errors since (i) liability insurances are widespread and provide deep coverage and (ii) experience-rated contracts are rare. Remaining explanations are time costs (legal processes), reputation costs, and medical "shaming" cultures. If these explanations are relevant, introducing non-reporting penalties could strengthen reporting incentives, but may be a bad idea if such systems are already malfunctioning. Several studies on US institutions point to the presence of significant judicial imperfections (e.g. noisy negligence rules, substantial legal costs, random jury decision-making) and the practising of defensive medicine. At the same time, claims are lower than the true number of negligent adverse events. If so, non-reporting penalties could reinforce existing inefficiencies. The imposition of non-reporting penalties may require more fundamental malpractice reforms if benefits are to exceed costs.
In some medical specialities error costs are generally high, while the liability probability is typically low, e.g. due to great uncertainty about the efficiency of treatment. In other cases, error costs may be low but liability probabilities high. In the first case, a punitive sanction system is needed, while in the second a less punitive one is adequate. Our conclusions derive from a simple model and many extensions are possible. One approach is to consider heterogeneity and asymmetric information in relation to moral costs and error probabilities. It would also be possible to consider the role of risk preferences, let precautionary effort affect the distribution of error costs, or let informational quality depend on error types as well as information sources.
Appendix: A Dynamic Model with a Feedback Mechanism
A dynamic model with a feedback mechanism, explicitly linking learning effects to the error probability function, is presented below. Let the error probability function be P(e t , R t ), where e t is (still) the level of precautionary care (at date t), while R t is the stock of knowledge (at date t) where P R < 0 and P R R > 0. Furthermore, a function m(n t ) (where m n t > 0), which transforms the quantity of information received at date t, n t , into additions to the stock of knowledge, is introduced, where n t = P(e t , R t )I t . P(e t , R t ) is the expected number of errors with a given number of treatments normalised to 1, at date t. I t is the share of errors that becomes common knowledge where I t ∈ [q, 1] (for more on this variable see Section 4). The social problem, formulated in continuous time, now becomes:
The social planner minimises discounted expected social costs (see A.1) over an infinite horizon (where δ is the social discount rate), given an equation describing knowledge dynamics (A.2) and an initial stock of knowledge (A.3). The above problem can be solved by optimal control theory, and the current value Hamiltonian (H) becomes (where λ denotes the shadow value of the stock of knowledge):
It is evident from A.4 that the optimal path in I t is a corner solution; I * t = 1, saying that all errors should be self-reported. 41 The sufficient conditions, for I * t = 1 (time references are omitted in the following) are 42 :
Equation (A.5) characterises the optimal path of precautionary care. The two first terms were also observed in the static model (lexicographic preferences) of Section 2. The first term measures marginal effort costs and the second the marginal expected (immediate) social benefits from fewer patient injuries. The third term, unique to the dynamic model, captures foregone learning opportunities. The presence of the shadow value of knowledge, λ, reflects that a lower stock of knowledge at date t (due to a higher effort) has future social costs implications, since the future number of injuries, ceteris paribus, is now lower. The adjustments of the shadow value of knowledge along the optimal path are described by A.6. Under reasonable assumptions regarding technology, the dynamic model defines an optimal path with effort levels being less than optimal effort as defined by the static model (lexicographic preferences): e * . 43 In Section 2, lexicographic preferences ensured that optimal effort was determined by equalising marginal effort costs with the expected marginal social benefits for the current generation of patients. In the dynamic model, this could be achieved by setting λ ≡ 0-ignoring the shadow value of knowledge when determining optimal effort-hence, the priority given to future patient groups at the expense of current ones, will not be relevant.
In Section 4, analysing the upper binding constraint on s, a more flexible welfare function was introduced. This problem can be analysed by the dynamic model if a constraint is imposed on the share of reported errors, e.g. I t ≤Ī < 1. The value of k, the parameter attaching a social value to information, can be thought of as reflecting all the benefits present in the dynamic model (reflected by the third term in A.5). As already shown in Section 4, a higher evaluation of information benefits reduces the optimal level of precautionary care.
Notes
1. The terminology related to medical errors varies across sources. The terminology applied here is also used in studies estimating medical error frequencies. To economists the concept of preventable errors is somewhat unsatisfactory since it is not related to costs. The standard economic definition of negligence is "the failure to take cost-justified precautions that result in injury (negligent adverse event) or could have resulted in injury (negligent near miss)". 2. Kessler and McClellan (2002) define defensive medicine as "precautionary treatment with minimal expected medical benefit out of fear of legal liability". 3. The public attention on medical malpractice has increased significantly the last few years, mainly because of the publication To err is human by The Institute of Medicine of the National Academy of Sciences (see Kohn et al., 1999) . The report received massive attention, and the main conclusions were that health care is risky since iatrogenic injuries are common and involve considerable costs. The total US national costs for adverse events are estimated to be between $37.6 and $50 billion while for preventable adverse events it is between $17 and $29. Important publications on this topic outside US are DH (2000) and Runciman and Moller (2001) . Kohn et al. (1999) recommends a system with mandatory error reporting for adverse events and voluntary error reporting for near misses. An evaluation of this proposal is undertaken in Grepperud (2003) within a model framework similar to the one presented here. 4. Several studies confirm the underreporting of adverse events. Cullen et al. (1995) find that errors are underreported by a factor of 10. Barach and Small (2000) refer to literature where the annual underreporting of adverse events ranges from 50-96%. 5. One approach is to record all information in a computerised database parallel to what have been done in sectors with well-developed reporting systems (aviation and nuclear industry). However, errors in health care are different as they are less visible and dramatic and only concern one individual at a time. 6. The disbelief in the ability of deterrence to create quality improvements is explained by factors such as a general disbelief in the effectiveness of legal sanctions, liability implemented at wrong levels, barriers to error reporting, and because deterrence induces defensive practices and defensive medicine. 7. Reason (2000) classifies failures as active and latent. Active failures are unsafe acts committed by people who are in direct contact with the patient. Latent failures are error provoking conditions (system failures) such as time pressure, understaffing, inadequate equipment, fatigue and inexperience. 8. The forthcoming analysis does not consider the optimal level of liability (individual, departments, or hospital) .
It seems natural to advise targeting liability at the levels with the ability to respond to such incentives. It is not always obvious that the individual clinical decision-maker is the adequate level. In the text, however, we use physicians as responsible agents but in practice health care organisations and hospital departments (enterprise liability) may be responsible. 9. The actual institutions that address deterrence and patient compensation vary across countries and health care sectors (private or public). In countries with no-fault systems, individual negligence is not linked directly to patient compensation (wider criteria are applied). However, such systems assign individual blame as well, based on administrative penalties, medical boards, ethical committees and criminal laws. 10. Hence, the possibility of having defensive practices-defined as strategies that reduce the probability of being penalized without improving expected health benefits-as a separate decision variable is ruled out (see e.g. Danzon, 1991; Simon, 1982) . 11. Liability and detection probabilities may e.g. depend on negligence rules, medical review efforts, monitoring efforts, and the structure of the patient compensation system. 12. Legal costs depend on the number of disputes (the accuracy of the negligence rule) but also on the mechanisms chosen for resolving disputes (judicial systems, medical courts or administrative programmes). 13. See Harford (1987), Malik (1993) , Kaplow et al. (1994) , Heyes (1996) and Livernois and McKenna (1999) .
14. It follows that the distribution of health outcomes is independent of preventive effort. I know of no evidence that contradicts this assumption. 15. This distinction is meant to reflect the high degree of error heterogeneity that exists. At the same time, this approach shows how important a providers' perception of liability risks is, given the occurrence of an error, for the subsequent reporting decisions. However, this distinction can be removed (e.g. r i where i = A, N .) without changing any conclusions. 16. Sexton, Thomas and Helmreich (2000) report that more than half of the intensive care staff find it difficult to discuss mistakes because of personal reputation and possible disciplinary actions. 17. The professional's feeling of guilt and remorse may also include concerns for the patient. The parameters a and b are the same for all states. 18. Detection is costless since following from patients' reports. 19. One interpretation of the four error types follows by assuming that the two liability probabilities (r H H and r H L ) are associated with commonly known shares: γ and 1 − γ (e.g. high and low quality of evidence), respectively, while the liability probabilities (r L H and r L L ) are associated with the µ and 1 − µ (high and low quality of evidence), respectively. Now,
. 20. In the following it is assumed that v ij = 1. 21. Note that the model allows for near miss liability which implies that a penalty can be imposed independently of patient injury. What matters is whether the responsible agent has failed to take due care. 22. This definition agrees with economists' definition of "due care", since effort levels lower than e * represent failure to take cost-justified precautions. However, our model does not rule out errors of type I and II, due to the presence of market failures e.g. noisy negligence rules and court errors. In economic models with perfect information, the decision-maker can avoid negligent errors with certainty by investing effort equal to (or higher) e * . 23. The quality of information is assumed to be the same across error types and information sources. Data collection must be followed by epidemiological analysis in order to reveal systematic patterns of infrequent episodes and this information must be passed on to providers. There can be economics of scale in learning. 24. The optimal accountability penalty changes if moral costs are included into the social welfare function. Let ω be the fraction of moral costs that enters social welfare: 0 < ω < 1. The first-best penalty now becomes:
, which implies a higher t * for any β D, b and r compared to (8). 25. This assumption is satisfied if: m t * (q N − q A ) < r NH (1 − q N )q A − r AH (1 − q A )q N . 26. Note that when ex-ante decisions are made, the provider and the regulator have similar information. Furthermore, error detection and fines are costless instruments and ex-post information asymmetry is overcome by setting a sufficiently high non-reporting penalty. 27. Remember, the decision-maker is unable to distinguish ex-ante between adverse events and near misses. 28. Note that the first-best penalty level is not tied to patient damage, as is normally the case in malpractice systems. The revenues collected over time from adverse event liability will generally differ from patient damages. However, they need not be less e.g. if informal penalties are low and social costs exceed patient costs. In addition, additional revenues are collected from near miss liability and non-reporting penalties which can be used if desirable to compensate injured patients. 29. There is however a risk of "overshooting" when the regulator is imperfectly informed. 30. Penalty levels may have a direct impact on the significance of moral costs e.g. that a less punitive environment creates thrust and thus strengthens reporting incentives (see e.g. Cohen, 2000; Reason, 2000) . Such interdependencies are not included in this analysis. 31. The concepts of mandatory and voluntary reporting systems are frequently applied in the literature. Kohn et al, (1999) define mandatory reporting as systems that hold providers accountable for performance, where regulatory bodies have the authority to investigate specific cases and issue penalties or fines for wrongdoing. However, penalties for not reporting are not mentioned. 32. The cost of implementing and running the various schemes is not included. 33. The intent of anonymous reporting is to ensure that the reporter cannot be identified from the report. Confidentiality differs from anonymity in that analysts can contact reporters for additional information. 34. This is done by letting the report be handled by an independent bureau with an obligation to protect the source.
35. The possible relationship between less punitive environments and the significance of moral costs may differ across sanction regimes. Voluntary reporting can lower a since the failure to report is not considered a law violation while confidentiality may lower b. Given laissez faire, both a and b may be reduced. 36. Non-punitive reporting programmes may provide more useful error information than punitive ones; since practitioners can now tell the complete story without fear of retribution (see e.g. Cohen, 2000) . 37. Since the first-best is unattainable various second-best policies could be considered e.g. investments in costly monitoring activities and stricter definitions of negligence to increase liability (legal costs). 38. In Section 1, the share of self-reported errors was not restricted by an upper limit on s. 39. This particular ranking follows from introducing the two following assumptions: (I) r AH > r NH > r AL > r NL and (II) r AH (1 − q A ) < r NH (1 − q N ). 40. Since a lower t still increases the number of medical errors, the ethical dilemma can still be said to be present.
One way of handling this problem is to ignore all social benefits that follow from this particular information source. 41. This conclusion follows because there are no variable costs associated with raising the value of I t . Transforming information about errors into relevant knowledge will obviously be costly (e.g. registration costs, resources invested in data analysis, costs associated with informing health care decision-makers), however, a high share of such costs will be fixed. 42. Additional assumptions on technology are needed to ensure that the sufficient conditions are fulfilled for the problem described in A.1-A.3. 43. This conclusion is valid for the early phases of the planning horizon, but may, depending on technology assumptions, may change in the future.
